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W J. Fenrick* The Prosecution of
War Criminals in Canada
"The country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast - Man's laws,
not God's - and if you cut them down - d'you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil
benefit of law, for my own safety's sake." (Robert Bolt, A Man for All
Seasons)
I. Introduction
A Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, headed by Mr. Justice Jules
Deschenes, was established by the Federal Government on 7 February
1985 to determine whether or not alleged Nazi war criminals were
resident in Canada and to recommend legal measures to ensure that such
war criminals are brought to justice.' The Commission submitted a two
part Report to the Governor General in Council on 30 December 1986.
Part I has been published2, and Part II, concerned with allegations against
specific individuals is confidential. The Commission, bearing in mind the
concern of the Canadian public about all atrocities related to the activities
of Nazi Germany during World War II, adopted a broad interpretation
of its mandate and reviewed allegations concerning both war crimes and
crimes against humanity.3 War crimes and crimes against humanity are
overlapping categories of offences. The distinctions and similarities of the
categories will be discussed in more detail later in this article. In brief,
war crimes are well established international offences committed in time
of hostilities and, generally speaking, directed against enemy nationals.
Crimes against humanity are a relatively new type of international crime
involving state directed atrocities committed in war or peace and aimed
at any distinctive group including a part of one's own population. In Part
I of the Report Mr. Justice Desch~nes concluded that there were alleged
Nazi war criminals resident in Canada and that existing legislation did
not contain an appropriate vehicle for their prosecution. He
recommended that the Criminal Code be amended so that war crimes
*Commander WJ. Fenrick, Director of International Law, Department of National Defense
Ottawa. The views expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect either
the policy or the opinion of the Canadian government.
1. P.C. 1985-348 7 Feb 1985.
2. Can. Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report Part I- Public (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1986) - Desch~nes Report.
3. Id, at 37-44.
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would be offences under Canadian law whether or not Canada had
participated in the specific war in which the crimes were committed and
so that crimes against humanity wherever and whenever committed
would be offences under Canadian law. Although Mr. Justice Desch~nes'
mandate was confined to war crimes related to the activities of Nazi
Germany during World War II, he considered it necessary to propose
legislative changes directed at all war crimes and all crimes against
humanity as "otherwise the legislation might be attacked as discrimina-
tory and repugnant to the principles of fundamental justice prevailing in
Canada and guaranteed under Section 7 of the Charter.' 4
The history of Canada's policy concerning Nazi war criminals is
essentially an account of forty years of apathy.5 Following World War II,
Canada tried a total of seven individuals before four war crimes tribunals
in 1945-46. In 1947, the Canadian Army War Crimes Investigation Unit
submitted its final report. In 1948, the Canadian government agreed to a
suggestion by the British government that no fresh trials be started after
August 31, 1948. Little effort was expended in the post war years to keep
war criminals out of Canada with the result that a small, but significant
number of alleged war criminals became Canadian residents. Sporadic
efforts were made by various pressure groups to arouse governmental
interest in the war crimes issue. These efforts met with little success until
1985 when the Desch~nes Commission was established. Canada's record
on the war crimes issue is by no means unique. Most of the Allied Powers
ignored the issue from approximately 1948 to 1980. Similarly, the recent
positive action by Canada is being replicated in the United Kingdom, the
United States and Australia, among other countries. Exactly why there
should be a present resurgence of interest in crimes committed in 1945
and earlier, rather than in 1955 or 1965 is by no means clear. From a
practical point of view, the major differences between now and then are
that the potential accused, the witnesses and the evidence are older and
probably less reliable and more difficult to locate.
Mere passage of time cannot erase the appalling horror of Nazi war
crimes. The fact that an accused murderer has led an exemplary life for
many years following his alleged offence is not considered a valid defence
to a charge of murder before a Canadian court. Neither should
subsequent conduct in Canada bar prosecution for monstrous offences
committed outside of Canada provided that such a prosecution is in
4. Id, at 151.
5. Id, at 25-33, D. Matas with S. Charendoff, Justice Delayed - Nazi War Criminals in
Canada (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1987), and A. Rodal, Nazi War Criminals in Canada
The Historical and Policy setting from the 1940s to the Present unpublished report prepared for
the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals September 1986.
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compliance with both Canadian and international law. In order to
determine whether or not alleged war criminals can be prosecuted before
Canadian courts, it is necessary to review the law of war, war crimes, war
crimes trials, jurisdiction in international law, the Canadian experience
with the law of war, and the governmental response to the recommenda-
tions of the Deschenes Commission. In order to avoid turning an article
into a treatise, certain relevant issues of domestic law, such as evidentiary
matters and the general question of the impact of the lengthy delay
between alleged deed and prosecution 6 shall not be addressed. Crimes
involving the killing or mistreatment of civilians will be stressed as it is
probable that current prosecutions for World War II incidents would
focus on such offences. The article focuses on war crimes in the strict
sense, not on crimes against humanity, as crimes against humanity raise
a number of additional legal issues. 7
II. The Law of War
The law of war is the body of international law which regulates the
conduct of parties to an international armed conflict. Although there is
some controversy concerning the extent to which the law of war applies
in the absence of a formal declaration of war, the generally accepted view
at the present time, is that no such declaration is necessary and that the
law of war applies whenever armed forces are committed to combat
against foreign armed forces or are in combat outside of their own
territory.8 The law of war (also referred to as the law of armed conflict)
applies to any interstate armed conflict without a requirement to meet a
threshold of either violence or duration. For example, the law of war
applied to the recent fighting between Iran and the USA in the Persian
Gulf as well as to the fighting between Iran and Iraq. As a general
6. Deschenes, supra note 2, at 148-50.
7. The two classic articles on crimes against humanity are E. Schwelb, "Crimes Against
Humanity" (1946), 23 B.YI.L. 178-226, and S.L. Goldenberg, "Crimes Against Humanity -
1945-1970" (1971), 10 U.W.O. L. Rev. 1-55.
8. Older law of war treaties, such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, indicate they
apply where two or more parties are "at war" with one another. More modem treaties, such
as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, indicate they "shall apply to all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." The most recent general law
of war treaty, Additional Protocol I of 1977, extends its scope of application to include a
limited category of conflicts hitherto considered internal armed conflicts in which "peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self determination." Formal declarations of war were uncommon
before the establishment of the United Nations. They are now extremely rare. The extension
of the scope of application of Protocol I to include so-called CAR conflicts is binding only on
states which are party to Protocol I.
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statement, the law of war has limited application in internal armed
conflicts (insurgencies, rebellions, civil wars, etc.) in the absence of
agreement to the contrary by the parties to the conflict. The first law of
war treaty provision specifically applicable to internal armed conflicts
was Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The first
general law of war treaty specifically designed for internal armed conflicts
was Additional Protocol II of 1977. Also, generally speaking, the law of
war does not regulate the treatment by a belligerent of its own nationals
or those of co-belligerents. 9
The law of war is traditionally divided into two components or
streams each named after the city where most of the relevant agreements
were drafted: the Law of Geneva, concerned essentially with the
protection of victims of war, and the Law of the Hague, concerned
essentially with methods and means of combat. The Law of Geneva is
normally a much more developed body of law than the Law of the
Hague as states are reluctant to limit the way in which they conduct
warfare. In recent years, particularly since the Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 were adopted in 1977, there has been a
tendency for the Law of Geneva and the Law of the Hague to merge, as
the Protocols address both the protection of victims of war and methods
and means of combat. The generally accepted purposes of the law of war
are: to protect both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary
suffering; to safeguard certain fundamental human rights of persons who
fail into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians, and to facilitate the
restoration of peace.
The law of war, as a field of international law, finds its sources in
international conventions or treaties, international custom, and the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The major
treaties concerned with the law of war prior to World War II were:
Hague Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Law and Customs of War
on Land'0 , the two Geneva Conventions of 1929, the first concerning the
wounded and sick" and the second concerning prisoners of war 12, Hague
Convention X of 1907 for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
9. None of the treaty provisions applicable to internal armed conflicts uses the expression "war
crime" or its more modem equivalent, "grave breach". Atrocities committed in internal
conflicts are breaches of domestic law. Such acts might, in appropriate circumstances,
constitute crimes against humanity. They would not be war crimes.
10. D. Schindler and J. Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflict 2nd. ed. (Alphen aan den
Rijn, the Netherlands: Sitjhoff & Noordhoff, 1981) at 57-92.
11. Id, at 257-270.
12. Id, at 271-298.
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Principle of the Geneva Convention 13 and the 1936 London Protocol
concerning submarine warfare a . Canada was bound by all of these
treaties during World War II. Japan and the USSR did not ratify the
1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. It is possible that these
two failures to ratify, that is, become legally bound, contributed to the
gross mistreatment of prisoners of war by Japan and to the gross
mistreatment of each other's prisoners by the USSR and Germany during
the Second World War. Article 2 of Hague Convention IV of 1907
contains a general participation clause whereby the Convention ceases to
be binding if a country which is not a party to it takes part in the war.
At least one belligerent power in each of the World Wars was not a party
to Hague Convention IV with the result that Hague Convention IV, as a
treaty, was not in effect during either war.
For post World War II conflicts, the major law of war treaties relevant
to the war crimes issue are: Hague Convention IV of 1907, the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 concerned with: I the Wounded and Sick s,
II the Maritime Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 16, III Prisoners of
War 7, and IV Civilians' s, and the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention.a9 . Canada ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1965.
More states are bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 165 as of June
30, 1988, than are members of the United Nations, 159. The only state
of substantial size which is not bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions
is Burma. Canada is not a party to the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention. For post 1977 armed conflicts, it is also necessary to
determine whether or not Additional Protocol I of 197720 concerning
international armed conflicts is in effect. Protocol I has been ratified by
76 states as of June 30, 1988. Canada has indicated it intends to ratify
Protocol I, but it has not yet enacted the necessary implementing
legislation.
Custom is one of the primary sources of international law. Whether or
not a custom exists is, however, difficult to determine.2' Custom which is
relevant to the law of war is even more difficult to determine as, in
warfare, the published views of states may not coincide with their actions.
13. Id, at 245-252.
14. Id, at 795-797.
15. Id, at 305-331.
16. Id, at 333-354.
17. Id, at 355-425.
18. Id, at 427488.
19. Id, at 661-688.
20. Id, at 551-618.
21. M. Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International Law" (1974-75), 47 B.Y..L. 1-53.
Custom consists of a combination of state practice and a sense that such practice is legally
required. The second element, opiniojuris, is difficult to identify.
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The law of war is rooted in customary law. As a general statement,
however, most of the contemporary law of war is contained in treaty
texts. The preamble to Hague Convention IV of 1907 contains a clause
known as the Martens clause (named after Friedrich von Martens, the
Russian deligate to the 1899 Hague Conference) which addresses the
relationship of customary and conventional law of war:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included
in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. 22
The Martens clause is frequently referred to in discussions of the law of
war when no specific treaty provision appears to be relevant to a
particular problem. Under certain circumstances, treaty provisions may
be declaratory of customary law or provide a convenient statement of
what has subsequently come to be recognized as customary law.23
The relationship of customary and conventional law is particularly
relevant to World War II war crimes cases as, technically, Hague
Convention IV of 1907 was not applicable as a treaty in that conflict and
as the USSR and Japan were not party to the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of
War Convention. As a result, unless the contents of these treaties were
embedded in customary law, specific provisions could not be used to
form the basis of war crimes charges. Concerning Hague Convention IV,
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg held:
The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly
represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their
adoption. But the Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt "to
revise the general laws and customs of war", which it thus recognized to
be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were
recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory
of the laws and customs of war... 24
Although this statement is unsubstantiated in the judgement, it has been
unchallenged since it was first uttered. The IMT also addressed briefly the
defence argument that the accused could not be held liable for the murder
or mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war as the USSR was not a party
to the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. It rejected this
22. Schindler and Toman, supra note 10, at 64.
23. R.R. Baxter "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary Law" (1965-66), 41 B.YI.L.
275-300, and "North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement", [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3.
24. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals Nuremberg 30th September and 1st October, 1946 (London: HMSO, Cmd. 6964
(1946) at 65.
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argument, holding that there were applicable principles of general
international law concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and these
principles prohibited murder or mistreatment.2 5
In the German High Command Trial, a US Military Tribunal sitting at
Nuremberg in 1947-8 adopted the IMT position that Hague Covention
IV of 1907 was binding as declaratory of international law and went on
to detail how specific provisions of Hague Convention IV and of the
1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention were incorporated into
customary law.26 Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been so
widely ratified it is unlikely they would not be applicable as treaties in an
international armed conflict, the relationship of treaty law to customary
law remains important27. In particular, the question of the relationship of
the Additional Protocols of 1977 to customary law will remain of
concern until they are as widely ratified as the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.28
Although the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
constitute one of the accepted sources of international law, in general, as
these principles are derived from the comparative study of domestic legal
systems, they are of limited relevance to the law of war.29 They are,
however, of particular relevance where crimes against humanity are
concerned, as these crimes can include mistreatment by a belligerent of its
own nationals. Crimes against humanity will be discussed briefly in the
following sections.
The law of war is not a static body of law. Additional Protocol I of
1977, for example, prohibits the type of carpet bombing which was
common during World War II. It would be inappropriate to penalize
World War II bombing practitioners for conduct which might
contravene today's standards, but which may have been acceptable by
the standards of the day. In order to determine the content of the law of
war applicable in a particular conflict, it is necessary to determine the
content of contemporary customary law and to determine which treaties
are applicable to the conflict.
25. Id, at 48.
26. "The German High Command Trial", 12 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals
(LRTWC) 1 at 86-94.
27. T. Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law" (1987), 81 A.J.I.L. 348-70.
28. "The Sixth Annual American Red Cross - Washington College of Law Conference on
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions" (1987), 2 Am U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y
415-538.
29. Bing Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
(Cambridge: Grotius, 1987).
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When appraising wartime conduct one must always distinguish
between law as illusion and law as reality. All the major naval powers
became party to the 1936 London Submarine Protocol which prohibited
attacks by submarines without warning on merchant vessels. Technically,
the London Protocol is still in effect. With the debatable exception of
Japan, no major naval power complied with a strict interpretation of the
Protocol during World War II. No one was punished following the war
for attacking merchant vessels without warning. The German Admirals,
Doenitz and Raeder, were convicted on charges of waging unrestricted
submarine warfare, but no sentence was awarded on the charge because
of similar allied practices. The few other naval war crimes cases
concerned the massacre of survivors, not the normal practice of sinking
on sight.30
Anyone engaged in trying to assess wartime conduct must bear in
mind the bleak realities of war. In the grim words of Henry Stimson, U.S.
Secretary of War during World War II; "The face of war is the face of
death: death is an inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader
gives". 31 War is about killing people and breaking things. Law does not
and cannot prevent such activities. At best the law can have an impact on
the margins of extreme situations by reducing the net amount of human
suffering.
The concept of collateral injury is an important part of both the law of
war and of military practice. One fact which soon becomes apparent to
any officer concerned with military operations is that projectiles don't
always go where you want them to go. Every type of weapons has what
is called a circular error probable or CEP. The CEP for a given weapon
is the radius within which 50% of the projectiles aimed at a given point
may be expected to land. The corollary is that 50% of the projectiles may
land outside this radius. Weapon accuracy is dependent upon the state of
technology at a given point in time. It may also be dependent upon the
quality of enemy opposition. As an example, one might expect the
aircrew of a fighter bomber to have somewhat more difficulty delivering
bombs on target if someone is firing missiles at them than if they are
doing a practice run over the prairies of Saskatchewan. Related to the
weapon accuracy problem is the fact that in many cases valid military
objectives such as munitions factories or military headquarters are
located in towns or cities adjacent to civilian population concentrations.
Modern urban planners do not take into account the requirements of the
30. W.J. Fenrick, "The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare" (1986), 24
C.Y.I.L. 91 at 106-07.
31. R. Schaffer, Wings of Judgment American Bombing in World War I (New York: O.U.P.,
1985) at 168.
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law of war when making planning decisions. The end result is that
civilian casualties and property damage, that is, collateral injury, is a
frequent consequence of military operations directed against valid
military objectives in compliance with the law of war. The only way to
avoid collateral injury is to avoid war. This is a desirable approach but
contemporary history does not indicate it is universally practiced. At
root, the law of war is an attempt to balance humanitarian and military
imperatives. It is, and must be, a body of law which is workable during
war.
III. War Crimes
The term "war crimes" is used with a variety of meanings. In the widest,
colloquial, sense, "war crime" includes crimes against peace and crimes
against humanity within its scope. A review of narrower, more traditional
definitions indicates "war crime" means "any violation of the laws of
warfare (or usages of war) (or customs of war) committed by any person
or persons, military or civilian. '32 It is questionable whether one should
consider all violations of the law of war as war crimes or adopt a more
restrictive approach. The current British Manual of Military Law33,
32. The current (1956) US Army Law of Land Warfare Manual states: "The term "War
Crime" in the technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any person or persons,
military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime." The 1929 UK Manual
of Military Law, which was used by the Canadian Army during World War II states:
441. The term "War Crime" is the technical expression for such an act of enemy
soldiers and enemy civilians as may be visited by punishment or capture of the
offenders. It is usual to employ this term, but it must be emphasized that it is used in
the technical military and legal sense only, and not in the moral sense. For although
some of these acts, such as abuse of the privileges of the Red Cross badge, or the murder
of prisoners, may be disgraceful, yet others, such as conveying information about the
enemy, may be highly patriotic and praiseworthy. The enemy, however, is in any case
entitled to punish these acts as war crimes.
442. War crimes may be divided into four different classes: -
(i) Violations of the recognized rules of warfare by members of the armed forces.
(ii) Illegitimate hostilities in arms committed by individuals who are not members of
the armed forces.
(iii) Espionage and war treason.
(iv) Maruading.
The current UK Manual of Military Law (1958) states:
624. The term "war crime" is the technical expression for violations of the laws of
warfare, whether committed by members of the armed forces or by civilians. It has also
been customary to describe as war crimes such acts as espionage and so-called war
treason which, although not prohibited by International Law, are properly liable to
punishment by the belligerent against which they are directed. Howeverthe accuracy of
the description of such acts as war crimes is doubtful.
33. The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law (London: HMSO,
1958).
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prepared with the assistance of that very distinguished British
international lawyer, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, contains a particularly
intimidating triad of propositions: (a) war crimes include all violations of
the law of war (para 624), (b) all war crimes are subject to universal
jurisdiction (para 637) and (c) all war crimes are punishable by death
(para 638). The triad may be a useful heuristic device for the military
reader but one might question its accuracy as a statement of the law.
Indeed, in one of his other writings, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht suggested
that textbook writers and military manuals have erred on the side of
comprehensiveness and that there should be a distinction between
violations of rules of warfare, and war crimes. He proposed a narrower
definition of war crimes as:
such offences against the law of war as are criminal in the ordinary and
accepted sense of fundamental rules of warfare and of general principles of
criminal law by reason of their heinousness, their brutality, their ruthless
disregard of the sanctity of human life and personality, or their wanton
interference with rights of property unrelated to reasonably conceived
requirements of military necessity.34
In any event, it is reasonable to presume that Canadian prosecutors
today, when concerned with World War II events, would restrict charges
to those which resulted directly or indirectly in death, serious injury or
serious property damage.
It is necessary to distinguish between war crimes, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity. The near classical differentiation of these
categories is contained in Article 6 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg which states:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
34. H. Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes" (1944), 21
B.YI.L. 58 at 79.
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civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any
of the forgoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
persons in execution of such plan.35
We are concerned essentially with war crimes in the narrower, Article
6(b) sense. The category of "crimes against peace" was used as the basis
for a prosecution for the first time after World War II. Although crimes
against peace might be considered to constitute the fundamental war
crimes, no one has been charged with commission of crimes against peace
since the immediate aftermath of World War II. The general tenor of the
IMT decision makes it clear that a crime against peace charge may only
be laid against major decision makers.
The Article 6 definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity
overlap to a considerable extent. In particular, both focus on murder and
ill treatment of individuals. It is possible for the same act to be a war
crime and a crime against humanity. As a general statement, war crimes
were, at the end of World War II, traditional international law offences
committed against traditional victims such as prisoners of war or the
civilian population of occupied territory. Crimes against humanity were,
however, recently crystalized international law offences committed
against non-traditional victims such as offences committed by an enemy
against its own citizens. There is very little evidence prior to World War
II that international law took cognizance of how a state treated its own
citizens.36 The international law of human rights is essentially a post-
World War II development.
Aside from their different times of origin, the major distinctions
between crimes against humanity and war crimes under Article 6 are: (a)
war crimes are offences committed by persons linked to one side to an
armed conflict against neutral citizens or citizens of a belligerent on the
other side, while the victims of crimes against humanity may be citizens
of any country, (b) crimes against humanity must be carried out in
pursuance of a policy of persecution on political, racial or religious
grounds, while no such policy is required for war crimes, and (c) to be a
war crime, an act must have been committed during a war or an
international armed conflict. The requirement for a crime against
humanity to be linked to an international armed conflict is less clear. It
35. Schindler and Toman, supra note 10, at 826.
36. Schwelb and Goldenberg, supra note 7.
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must, however, be noted that the IMT, in its judgement, excluded acts
before 1939 from the crimes against humanity category of Article 6 on
the ground that it was not adequately established that such acts were
committed in the execution of or in connection with any other crime
within the jurisdiction of the tribunal 7
The first international document which attempts to eliminate the IMT
imposed time and place restriction on crimes against humanity is the
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind
transmitted to the UN General Assembly in 1954 by the International
Law Commission. Art. 2, section II of the Draft Code defines crimes
against humanity as follows:
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or
persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social,
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State
or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of
such authorities.3t
In a report, the International Law Commission explained why it
expanded the scope of crimes against humanity to include peace time
offences.
'The commission', 'decided to enlarge the scope of the paragraph so as to
make the punishment of the acts enumerated in the paragraph
independent of whether or not they are committed in connection with
other offenses defined in the draft code'. 'On the other hand', it continued,
'in order not to characterize any inhuman act committed by a private
individual as an international crime, it was found necessary to provide that
such an act constitutes an international crime only if committed by the
private individual at the instigation or with the toleration of the authorities
of a State'.39
The Draft Code remains a draft. The first treaty to indicate that crimes
against humanity were international crimes whether committed in war or
peace was the 1968 Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, to which, for
other reasons, neither Canada nor any other Western country is bound.40
Unfortunately, there is no single generally accepted codification of the
law of war nor is there what might be called a "war crimes" Criminal
Code. Pre-World War II law of war treaties do not contain offence
sections. Indeed Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 respecting the Laws
37. IMT Judgement supra note 24, at 65.
38. Quoted in Goldenberg, supra note 7, at 18.
39. Id, at 19.
40. Schindler and Toman, supra note 10, at 837-43. The probable reason for non-ratification
is the extended definition of crimes against humanity which includes "eviction by armed attack
or occupation or inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid."
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and Customs of War on Land, breaches of which formed the basis of
most war crimes charges, contains the following provision:
ARTICLE 3
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed
forces.41
Art. 3 appears to envisage state responsibility for financial compensation,
not individual criminal repsonsibility.
The legal basis for the statement of the offence for World War II war
crimes appears to be the applicable treaties and extrapolation therefrom,
with particular reliance on the Martens clause, and customary law. For
example, many charges involved the murder or mistreatment of the
population of occupied territory. The only treaty provision specifically
addressing the treatment of this group prior to World War II was Art. 46
of the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907 and this
stated simply: "Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice must be
respected .... ,,42 Although the relevant treaties did not specify that
particular acts constituted war crimes, the various national law of war
manuals did list the major violations. For example, para 443 of Chapter
XIV (The Laws and Usages of War on Land) from the 1929 UK Manual
of Military Law states:
443. The more important violations are the following: - making use of
poisoned and otherwise forbidden arms and ammunition; killing of the
wounded; refusal of quarter; treacherous request of quarter; maltreatment
of dead bodies on the battlefield; ill treatment of prisoners of war; breaking
of parole by prisoners of war; firing on undefended localities; abuse of the
flag of truce; firing on the flag of truce; abuse of the Red Cross flag and
badge and other violations of the Red Cross Convention; use of civilian
clothing by troops to conceal their military character during battle;
bombardment of hospitals and other privileged buildings; improper use of
privileged buildings for military purposes; poisoning of wells and streams;
pillage and purposeless destruction; ill-treatment of inhabitants in
occupied territory.
Art. 6 of the IMT Charter, quoted above, expanded upon Hague Rule 46
to indicate war crimes include murder, ill-treatment and deportation of
the civilian population of occupied territory and also the killing of
hostages. A lengthy analysis of post-World War II war crimes cases
41. Id, at 65.
42. Id, at 83.
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conclude that, under the above rubric, courts addressed charges on a wide
variety of matters including:
(a) unwarranted killing;
(b) denial of a fair trial;
(c) ill-treatment;
(d) subjection to illegal experiments;
(e) deportation;
(f) forced labour of civilians;
(g) enforced prostitition;
(h) false imprisonment;
(i) denunciation to occupying authorities;
() illegal recruiting into armed forces;
(k) incitement of civilians to take up arms against their own country;
(1) genocide;
(m) denationalisation;
(n) invasion of religious rights; and
(o) wholesale substitution of existing courts of law.43
Generally speaking, the major law of war treaties adopted since World
War II have provisions differentiating between minor and major, or
grave, breaches of the treaty. In particular, states which are party to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 are obligated to comply with the
conventions in their entirety, but they are also obligated to enact
legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or
ordering the commission of grave breaches and to search for and bring
such persons to trial, or to hand them over to others for trial. For
example, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which is concerned
with the treatment of civilians, appears to codify the results of the war
crimes trials concerning the treatment of civilians. It contains the
following grave breach provisions:
ARTICLE 146
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in
accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons
over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such
a High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
43. 15 L.R.T.W.C. 113.
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Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention
other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of
proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those
provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
ARTICLE 147
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or
property protected by the present Convention; wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body of health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.44
Additional Protocol I of 1977 concerning international armed conflicts
also contains grave breach sections and some of these, for the first time,
specify that certain wilful acts concerning combat operations, such as
wilfully launching indiscriminate attacks, constitute grave breaches.45 It is
probable that specific implementing legislation detailing the elements of
the Protocol I grave breaches will be necessary before Canada ratifies the
treaty as it is very difficult to see how some of these grave breaches can
be assimilated to Criminal Code offences.
The question of who is a party to an offence is an issue which cannot
be glossed over in war crimes prosecutions. The obvious fact is that most
acts committed in wartime are authorized or at least condoned by the
state. If atrocities occur which are not authorized or condoned, one might
presume that the state to whose armed forces the culpable individuals
belong would take action to punish them. At the same time, unless one
desires to punish all citizens of a state or all members of the armed forces,
it is necessary to determine degrees of responsibility. For law of war
purposes, Nazi Germany cannot be regarded as a gang of bank robbers
or even as a Mafia organization. Quite obviously, individuals who
performed certain acts and those who ordered the acts can be considered
culpable, but what of the enormous cast of supporting players? What
about advisers, intermediate commanders and those performing ancillary
tasks? Has the railroad worker who loaded Jews onto boxcars for
44. Schindler and Toman, supra note 10, at 478-79.
45. Id, at 601-02.
Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada
transportation to extermination camps committed a war crime? Has the
intelligence officer who advised a commander that there were Jews in a
particular area committed a war crime if the commander subsequently
orders their extermination? Direct analogies with Criminal Code sections
concerning offences and parties may be inappropriate when the state is a
major actor in the incident. An argument that the railway worker has
engaged in forcible confinement may oversimplify a complex situation.
Earlier in this part, the distinctions between war crimes and crimes
against humanity were discussed. It is also necessary to distinguish
between war crimes and domestic crimes in a country at war. On land,
for an act to be a war crime, it must take place in a country involved in
an international armed conflict. That condition, however, although
necessary, is not sufficient. A single act such as the deliberate killing of an
innocent person may be the domestic crime of murder in the country
where it occurs, and also, depending on the existence or nonexistence of
other factors, a war crime and a crime against humanity. In time of war,
when anarchy prevails in many areas, it is possible there will be many
deliberate unlawful killings. They may all be acts of murder; it is unlikely
they are also all war crimes or crimes against humanity.
A few hypotheticals may illustrate the distinction. If, during World
War II, a German national or a national of a state allied to Germany
deliberately killed another innocent German national or a national of a
state allied to Germany, the act might, under certain circumstances,
constitute murder under the applicable domestic law and it might also
constitute a crime against humanity, but it could not constitute a war
crime unless the offender had substantial links to one side and the victim
was a neutral or had substantial links to the other side. In order to
constitute a crime against humanity the offender must be linked to a state
involved in the conflict and the victim must be stateless or linked to any
state involved in the armed conflict. As a general statement, for example,
during World War II, the hypothetical killing of a Roumanian Jew by a
Roumanian Fascist in Roumania prior to the entry of Roumania into
World War II would not be a crime against humanity, because, at that
time, involvement in the conflict by the relevant state was an essential
element of the offence. In addition, for an act to be a crime against
humanity, it must be carried out in pursuance of a state instigated or
tolerated policy of persecution on political, racial or religious grounds.
If, during World War II, a German national or a national of a state
allied to Germany killed an innocent national of a state not allied to
Germany, the act might constitute murder according to applicable
domestic law, a crime against humanity, if carried out, in pursuance of a
state instigated or tolerated policy of persecution on political, racial or
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religious grounds, and a war crime. As a general statement, there is no
requirement that an act be carried out in pursuance of a state instigated
or tolerated policy for it to be classified as a war crime. If a soldier kills
a prisoner of war or an unoffending enemy national in occupied territory,
he commits a war crime whether or not he carries out the act on his own
initiative, as a result of state policy, or as a result of directions by his
superiors. The question is: what, if any, state linkage must exist for an
ordinary crime to become a war crime? A contribution to the leading
Encyclopedia of Public International Law states: "War crimes include all
grave violations of the laws of war which are committed by the agents of
a belligerent state against the citizens or property of the enemy, of a
conquered nation, or of forcibly occupied neutral territory.... the
perpetrators are usually combatants.... '46 The accused in war crimes
cases have a wide variety of backgrounds and it is debatable whether or
not all of them could be described as agents of a belligerent state and it
is even more debatable whether or not they were implementing their role
as agents. For example, in the Essen Lynching Case47, German civilians
were convicted and severely punished by a British War Crimes Court for
participating in the activities of a lynch mob which murdered three
captured British airmen. Members of a lynch mob would not appear to
be agents of the state. Whether or not agent status exists, it would appear
that an essential element distinguishing a war crime from an ordinary
crime committed in war is that the offender must have some
demonstrable links to one side in an armed conflict and the victim must
not have a similar link to the same side. In most reported war crimes
cases, it would appear that the existence of such links is so obvious that
it is taken for granted. If for example, victim and offender belong to the
armed forces of opposing sides or even if victim or offender belongs to the
armed forces of one side and the other is a national of the opposing side,
it is unlikely the issue would be argued.
The issue of a demonstrable link is, however, of particular relevance
where victim and offender are of the same nationality or from countries
which are on the same side in the conflict. The prime examples of
problem situations would be incidents in concentration camps and
incidents in occupied territory. If one concentration camp inmate beats or
kills another inmate of the same or an allied nationality, it is unlikely a
war crime has been committed unless the offender has some
demonstrable link with the powers running the camp. In the Belsen Trial,
a number of concentration camp inmates employed as minor
46. H.H. Jeschek, "War Crimes", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North
Holland: Amsterdam, 1982) Vol. 4, at 294-98.
47. The Essen Lynching Case, 1 L.R.T.W.C.
Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada
functionaries by camp authorities were convicted on war crimes
charges.48 If an inhabitant of occupied territory kills or mistreats another
inhabitant of occupied territory, it would be necessary to show some link
between the offender and the occupying authority to classify the offence
as a war crime. It is suggested that this specific issue is not adequately
addressed in either the literature or the case law concerning war crimes
because individuals commiting such acts would normally have been dealt
with after World War II under the national laws before national courts
as collaborators with the enemy. Examples of linkages would be working
for the occupying authority, being paid, trained or equipped by the
occupying authority, being under the command or direction of the
occupying authority, or belonging to an organization with such links to
the occupying authority. To use a recent example, the Lebanese militia
which massacred Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in
1982 were, in many cases, paid, trained, equipped, and after a fashion,
under the control of Israeli authorities. They probably had an adequate
link with Israel to be considered as committing Israeli war crimes.
One cannot determine whether or not particular acts constituted war
crimes during World War II without considering the hostage and reprisal
issues. In the event of serious or persistent breaches of the law by a
belligerent, it may be necessary for the adverse party to resort to a reprisal
in an attempt to terminate such illegality. A reprisal is an illegal act
resorted to after the adverse party has himself indulged in illegal acts and
refused to desist therefrom after being called upon to do so. The reprisal
is not a retaliatory act or a simple act of vengeance. It must be
proportionate to the original wrongdoing, and must be terminated as
soon as the original wrongdoer ceases his illegal actions. The
proportionability is not strict, for it will often be greater than the original
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, there must be a reasonable relationship
between the original wrong and the reprisal measure. The doctrine of
reprisals has been frequently and seriously criticized on the basis that it is
not a particularly effective law enforcement device and that its end result
is frequently the escalation of the conflict.49 On the other hand, it is
possible that the existence of the reprisals doctrine does deter some
potential law breakers. At various periods in time, reprisals have been
prohibited against certain categories of protected persons. During World
48. The Belsen Trial 2 L.R.T.WC. 1 at 153-4.
49. The standard text on reprisals is F. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (Leyden: Sitjhoff
1971). See also A.R. Albrecht, "War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949" (1958), 47 AJIL 590, D. Bowett, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to
Armed Force" (1972), 66 AJIL 1, and M. Bristol, "The Laws of War and Belligerent Reprisals
against Enemy Civilian Populations" (1979), 21 Air Force L. Rev. 397.
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War II, reprisals against prisoners of war were prohibited;50 Art. 50 of the
rules annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907 prohibited the infliction
of collective penalties upon the population of occupied territories unless
in circumstances when the population was jointly and severally liable,
but it did not explicitly prohibit reprisals against this population.51 Para
458 of Chapter XIV (Laws and Usages of War on Land) of the 1929
British Manual of Military Law, which was used by British and
Commonwealth forces, including Canadian Forces, during World War II
clearly envisages reprisals directed against the inhabitants of occupied
territory. The same publication indicates, in paras. 461 through 464, that
the practice of taking hostages as a means of securing legitimate warfare
was in former times very common, it is now obsolete, but it was not
banned by Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. The manual clearly
envisages the occasional need to take hostages, but also states that hostage
prisoners should not be killed if the adverse party violates the law.
The distinction between hostage prisoners and reprisal prisoners is that
hostage prisoners are taken before the opposing side violates the law on
the understanding they will be punished if the opposing side does violate
the law while reprisal prisoners are taken after the opposing side violates
the law and then punished. Persons taken as reprisal prisoners or hostage
prisoners may fail to appreciate the fine distinction in their statuses. In
theory, hostage taking and reprisals are both intended as law enforcement
devices. The German forces and those allied with them took hostages and
reprisal prisoners and killed them on many occasions during World War
II. Some of the war crimes tribunals, particularly those concerned with
cases arising in Southern Europe, appear to have accepted that the
execution of hostages or reprisal prisoners might be permissible in certain
circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the IMT Charter, quoted
above, listed killing of hostages as a war crime. In the List Case, also
known as the Hostages Trial the tribunal listed a number of criteria
which might legitimize the killing of hostages or reprisal prisoners before
concluding the criteria were not met in that particular case.52 The case has
been severely criticized by Lord Wright, who concluded: "My own
settled opinion, based both on principle and on authority, is that the
killing of hostages (which includes reprisal prisoners) is contrary to the
law of war, and that it is not permissible in any circumstances, and that
it is murder. '53 The List Case was also distinguished in one of the other
50. Art. 2 of 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, Schindler and Toman, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 274.
51. Id, at 83-4.
52. "Trial of Wilhelm List and Others" 8 L.R.T.WC. 34 at 76-88.
53. Lord Wright, "The Killing of Hostages as a War Crime" (1948), 25 B.Y.I.L. 296 at 310.
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major war crimes trials, the Von Leeb Case, also known as the German
High Command Trial.54 The 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention
explicitly banned reprisals against the inhabitants of occupied territory
(Art. 33) and also prohibited the taking of hostages (Art. 34).55 Whatever
the situation may have been during World War II, it is clear that such
acts are now prohibited.
IV. War Crimes Trials
The reports of war crimes trials are of debatable relevance to present day
courts concerned with war crimes because there is no rule of precedent
in international law (although judicial decisions do have persuasive
authority) the reporting is patchy at best, and the trials have been held
before a wide variety of foreign and international tribunals. The reports
do, however, provide useful evidence of the evolving content of
customary law. The case which is normally referred to as the first war
crimes trial is the trial at Briesach in 1474 of Peter Von Hagenbach for
mistreating the inhabitants of occupied territory.5 6 Hagenbach was
subjected to severe torture and produced the predestined confessions. He
repudiated the confessions in open court, but was convicted on the basis
of other evidence. Hagenbach was sentenced to death and executed.
There are sporadic instances of war crimes trials of enemy nationals
prior to and during the First World War. These trials are not well
reported. A small number of German nationals were prosecuted, albeit
ineffectually, before German courts in Liepzig following the First World
War. In part as a result of these ineffectual proceedings, the Allied
Powers decided to try Axis nationals before their own courts following
the Second World War. The two best known Allied tribunals were the
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and at Tokyo, both of
which tried major war criminals and both of which had as their legal
basis substantially similar Charters issued by the Allied Powers. In
addition to the well reported proceedings of these two tribunals, there
were many war crimes trials conducted by national tribunals. Briefs of a
large number of these trials are contained in the Law Reports of Trials of
War Criminals (L.R.T.WC.) a series of fifteen thin volumes selected and
prepared by the UN War Crimes Commission. In addition, the U.S.
Government produced a large, fifteen volume series of verbatim
proceedings of Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. These two report series
54. "Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others", 12 L.R.T.W.C. 1 at 84-85.
55. Schindler and Toman, supra note 10, at 443.
56. G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals,
Volume II - The Law ofArmed Conflict (London: Stevens & Sons, 1968 at 462-66.
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contain a formidable and inadequately explored jurisprudence of the law
of war.
There have been very few war crimes trials since World War II,
involving conflicts other than World War II. It is understood that UN
forces in Korea gathered evidence for war crimes prosecutions, but no
trials were held. It is also understood that Bangladesh intended to try
some Pakistani prisoners on war crimes charges following the Bangladesh
conflict, but it did not do so. 57 American forces tried a number of their
own soldiers for war crimes type offences during the Vietnam conflict.
All of the accused were, however, charged with breaches of the United
States Uniform Code of Military Justice, not with war crimes as such.58
As a general statement, if one is at all possible, military prosecutors
handling war crimes type cases where the accused belong to the same
armed forces as the prosecutor would endeavour to charge the accused
with breaches of national law such as murder rather than with war
crimes. There are two excellent reasons for the preferred approach, the
court is more familiar with national law than with the law of war and the
public relations impact is slightly less unfavourable. There were also a
number of British and Israeli law of war cases in the 1960's and later, but
these cases focused more on the issue of combatant status than on war
crimes.59
A detailed review of the available war crimes case reports is not
feasible within the confines of this article. It is, however, possible to
indicate a few trends. First, most war crimes cases which go to trial
concern events outside of actual combat. Very few reported war crimes
cases concern offences committed during combat.60 It is unquestionable
that some war crimes are committed in combat and the reasons for the
relative paucity of combat related cases is unclear. Perhaps those
investigating war crimes pay particular heed to the extreme stresses and
the probable lack of premeditation in combat situations. One must also
concede that soldiers in combat have very short operational lives and that
the difficulties of gathering evidence may be almost insurmountable. It
does not appear that there were any war crimes cases concerning aerial
57. J.J. Paust & A.P. Blaustein, "War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh
Experience" (1978), 11 Vand. J. of Transnat.L. 1-38.
58. For example, Lieutenant Calley, a platoon leader involved in the My Lai massacre was
convicted of murder. US. v Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973). See also Calley v.
Callaway 519 F. 2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 911 (1976). An analysis of
Vietnam cases focusing on operational and psychological aspects is W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in
Hostilities" Marine Corps Gazette Aug 76 at 16-22 and Sep 76 at 33-39.
59. Military Prosecutor v OmarMahmudKassem and Others (Israeli Military Court, 1969) 42
Int. L. Rep.470-483, Mohammed Ali and Another v Public Prosecutor, [1968] 3 All. E.R.
488 (P.C.) and Public Prosecutor vKo4 [1968] 1 All. E.R. 419 (P.C.)
60. For a resume of the World War II experience, see 15 L.R.T.W.C. 109-112.
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bombardment following World War II, probably because the Allies were
the most effective practitioners of that form of warfare.61 Second, war
crimes are not strict or absolute liability offences. Intention or
recklessness is an element of a war crime. War crimes tribunals must
make decisions concerning culpability taking into account the state of
facts as they appeared to the accused. They should not judge on the basis
of hindsight.62 Third, certain parts of the law of war are contentious and
subject to interpretation. It is understood that soldiers and military
commanders may not have ready access to lawyers and legal texts. For
this reason, there is a tendency to prosecute only in cases where violations
of the law are clear cut and to give the accused the benefit of the doubt
when the law is unclear. 63
Three topics have been the subject of considerable discussion in case
law and in the literature, military necessity, superior orders and
command responsibility. The law of war has its foundation in an attempt
to reconcile military requirements or military necessity and humanitarian
imperatives. Military necessity is a concept whereby a belligerent is
justified in applying compulsion and force of any kind, to the extent
necessary for the realization of the purpose of war, that is, the complete
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least
possible expenditure of men, resources and money. The concept
presupposes:
a. the force used can be and is controlled;
b. the use of force is necessary to achieve as quickly as possible the
partial or complete submission of the enemy; and
c. the amount of force used is not greater in effect on enemy personnel
or property than needed to achieve his prompt submission.
Military necessity is not a concept which can be considered in isolation.
In particular, it does not justify violation of the laws of armed conflict as
military necessity was a factor taken into account when the laws were
drafted. The principle of military necessity is not the 19th Century
German Doctrine of Kriegsraison which asserted that war could justify
any measures - even in violation of the laws of war - when the
necessities of any particular action purportedly justified it. War crimes
trials after World War II clearly rejected this view. Military necessity
cannot justify actions absolutely prohibited by law as the means to
achieve military victory are not unlimited. Armed conflict must be
carried on within the limits of the prohibitions of international law,
61. History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. (London: HMSO, 1948) at 492.
62. The Hostages Trial supra note 52, at 67-69.
63. The German High Command Trial supra note 54, at 96-105.
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including the restraints inherent in the concept of "necessity". 64 Military
necessity is particularly relevant when agreements on the law of war are
being drafted, when explicit treaty law or generally accepted customary
law does not adequately address a problem, and as a loophole provision
in some treaties where certain actions are prohibited unless required by
military necessity. After the Second World War, the plea of military
necessity was raised by defendants before war crimes tribunals, usually in
connection with two categories of cases:
a. in regard to the treatment of prisoners of war and unarmed enemy
prisoners, unsuccessfully; and
b. in regard to the deportation of civilian inhabitants from and
devastation of property in occupied enemy territory, occasionally
successfully, as courts emphasized assessment of the situation as it
appeared to the accused in determining culpability.65
The question of whether or not superior orders should constitute a
defence to a war crimes charge against a subordinate is one which has
vexed military officers and legal writers for a considerable period of
time.66 A successful army in combat is not and cannot be a debating
society. Human lives can depend on whether or not orders to carry out
very dangerous tasks are carried out promptly. Soldiers are trained to go
in harm's way and a substantial proportion of any soldier's basic training
is devoted to teaching him to respond to orders. At the same time, a
soldier is a human being, not an unthinking automaton. As a general
statement, soldiers are only obliged to obey lawful commands and they
are obliged not to obey commands which are manifestly or obviously
unlawful. Most violations of the law of war which result in war crimes
charges are obviously unlawful, for example, orders to kill prisoners.
Sophisticated doctrinal arguments notwithstanding, the argument of
superior orders has rarely resulted in a successful defence to a war crimes
64. Military necessity is a particularly complex subject. The two most searching studies are
W.V. O'Brien, "The Meaning of 'Military Necessity' in International Law" (1957), 1 World
Polity 109 and W.V. O'Brien, "Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War" (1960), 2 World
Polity 35. Other studies are N.C.H. Dunbar, "Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials" (1952),
29 B.Y.I.L. 442, W.G. Downey, "The Law of War and Military Necessity" (1953), 47 Am. J.
Int. L. 251, and an unpublished study prepared by E. Rauch for the International Society of
Military Law and Law of War, "The Concept of Military Necessity in the Context of the Law
of War". A useful collection of definitions is contained in R.W. Gehring, "Loss of Civilian
Protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I" (1980), 90 Mil. L.R. 49,
54-58.
65. Dunbar, id, at 442-49.
66. The two leading studies are still Y. Dinstein, The Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders
in International Law (Leyden, 1965) and L.C. Green, Superior Orders in National and
InternationalLaw (Leyden, 1976).
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charge. It has, however, on occasion been combined with other elements
to raise a successful defence of duress.
The obverse of the defence of superior orders is the argument that a
commander is always responsible for the acts of his subordinates.67 The
Yamashita Case68, in which a Japanese general was sentenced to death
following World War II is often cited, erroneously, for the proposition
that commanders are absolutely responsible for war crimes committed by
their subordinates. A subsequent review of that case by Parks concluded:
"The value of the study of the Yamashita trial lies not in its often mistated
facts nor in the legal doctrine of strict liability it purportedly espoused (but
did not), but in the legal conclusions it actually reached. Yamashita
recognized the existence of an affirmative duty on the part of a
commander to take such measures as are within his power and
appropriate in the circumstances to wage war within the limitations of the
laws of war, in particular exercising control over his subordinates; it
established that the commander who disregards this duty has committed a
violation of the law of war.. 69-
A commander giving an order to commit a war crime is equally guilty of
the offence with the person actually committing it. He is also liable to
punishment if he knew or had information which should have enabled
him to conclude, in the circumstances at the time, that a subordinate was
committing or going to commit a breach of the law, and failed to take all
feasible steps to prevent or repress that breach. 70 Parks concluded that the
mental element necessary when the commander has not given the
offending order is (a) actual knowledge, or (b) such serious personal
dereliction on the part of the commander as to constitute wilful and
wanton disregard of the possible consequences or (c) an imputation of
constructive knowledge, that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the
commander, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
must have known of the offences charged and acquiesced therein.71
V. Jurisdiction
The word "jurisdiction" is used in international law to denote a wide
67. The three best articles are considered to be: W. Hays Parks, "Command Responsibility for
War Crimes" 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1-104, W.D. Burnett, "Command Responsibility and a Case
Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila
and Sabra" (1985), 107 Mil. L. Rev. 71-189, and L.C. Green, "War Crimes, Extradition and
Command Responsibility", in L.C. Green, Essays on the Modem Law of War (New York:
Transnational, 1985) at 215-37.
68. Trialof General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 40 L.R.T.W.C. 1-96.
69. Parks, supra note 67, at 37.
70. There is an attempt to codify the law concerning command responsibility in Art. 86 and
87 of Additional Protocol I. Schindler and Toman, op. cit. supra note 10, at 602-03.
71. Parks, supra note 67, at 101-104.
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variety of different things including the power of one state to perform acts
in the territory of another state (executive jurisdiction), the power of a
state's courts to try cases involving a foreign element (judicial
jurisdiction) and the power of a state to apply its laws to cases involving
a foreign element (legislative jurisdiction).72 Here we are concerned with
judicial jurisdiction in criminal trials, more particularly, the basis in
international law for Canadian courts to try alleged war criminals. We
are not concerned with the question of "venue" that is the allocation of
jurisdiction among particular Canadian criminal courts.
The main principles on which the claim is made to exercise criminal
jurisdiction in a particular case are:
a. the territorial principle - the offence was committed in whole or in
part on the territory of the state which purports to exercise
jurisdiction;
b. the nationality principle (also called the active nationality or active
personality principle) - the offender is a national of the state
concerned both at the time of offence and the time of trial;
c. the passive personality principle (also called the passive nationality
principle) - the victim is a national of the state concerned;
d. the protective principle - the offence was prejudicial to a limited
range of vital interests of the state claiming jurisdiction, such as
counterfeiting or espionage, and
e. the universality principle - any state which has the offender in
custody may exercise jurisdiction over him because of the nature of
the alleged offence.
As a general statement, if a state exercises jurisdiction on the basis of the
territoriality or nationality principles, its right to do so is unlikely to be
challenged. If it exercises jurisdiction on any other basis, it may be
required to justify its position.
To a considerable extent, one's legal conclusion to the question of
whether or not, in the absence of a treaty based right or a clear statement
of customary law, a state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction on the basis
of a rarely used universality principle. The universality principle is
dependent on personal philosophical predisposition and an analysis of the
1927 decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case
of the S.S. Lotus73. In a split decision, decided by the casting vote of the
President, the court addressed some fundamental aspects of international
law:
72. M. Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International Law" (1972-73), 46 B.Y.I.L. 145-257.
73. The S.S. Lotus (P.C.I.J. 1927) 2 W.C.R. 20.
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International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities with a view
to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence
of States cannot therefore be presumed....
It does not follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely
on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to
this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases.
But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at
present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most
suitable.74
A number of the dissenting judges strongly criticized the majority
decision. Judge Moore observed:
No one disputes the right of a State to subject its citizens abroad to the
operations of its own penal laws, if it sees fit to do so. This concerns simply
the citizen and his own government, and no other government can
properly interfere. But the case is fundamentally different where a country
claims either that its penal laws apply to other countries and to what takes
place wholly within such countries or, if it does not claim this, that it may
punish foreigners for alleged violations, even in their own country, of laws
to which they were not subject.75
The majority decision in the Lotus, which essentially holds that
everything which is not explicitly prohibited is permitted, encourages
jurisdictional experimentation by individual states which might be met
with a distinct lack of enthusiasm by their neighbours.
Where war crimes are concerned, the right to exercise jurisdiction on
the basis of the passive personality principle is generally accepted. This is
the basis on which Canada actually exercised its right to try war criminals
at the end of World War II. It is also considered that World War II war
crimes cases provide overwhelming support for the argument that states,
at that time, had a right to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes on the
74. Id, at 35.
75. Id, at 82.
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basis that the victims were co-belligerents, that is, an extension of the
passive personality principle.76 One factor which appears to indicate
Canadian support for this position is s.7(4) of the War Crimes
Regulations which allows allied officers to sit as members of Canadian
courts when allied interests are involved.77
The real jurisdictional question concerning war crimes is: in the
absence of treaty rights, may a state exercise jurisdiction over war crimes
on the basis of the universality principle? Further, if universality is an
accepted basis for jurisdiction over war crimes, when did it become
acceptable? A review of state practice in this area is not as helpful as one
might desire. Bearing in mind that Germany and Japan surrendered
unconditionally at the end of World War II and that, to a considerable
extent, the Allied Powers exercised sovereignty over them, it is difficult to
find a war crimes case in which universality is an essential basis of
jurisdiction. One of the few immediate post World War II cases which
might be dependent upon the universality principle is the trial of
Remmele, where the defendant was tried by a US Military Government
Court for war crimes committed against Russian and Czechoslovakian
nationals, although at the time of commission of the acts alleged the US
had not yet entered the war.78
Four later decisions, the Eichmann decision and three decisions
concerning Demjanjuk, all related to World War II incidents, also
support the view that states have a customary law right to exercise
jurisdiction over war crimes on the basis of the universality principle. All
of these cases involve, directly or indirectly, the state of Israel which was
not created until after World War II. The Supreme Court of Israel in its
judgment in the Eichmann case, which concerned war crimes and crimes
against humanity, provided a thorough review of the existing case law
and doctrinal writing without citing cases where reliance on the
universality principle was essential to establish jurisdiction.79 The court
referred to, among other material, an article by Sheldon Glueck, an
American legal scholar:
"All this means that customary international law is never static but is
found to be in a process of constant growth, as Glueck stressed (in his
article in Harvard Law Review, vol. 59, p. 414):
"... Customary international law ... is as obviously subject to growth
as has been the law of any other developing legal order, by the
76. A.R. Carnegie, "Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Laws and Customs of War" (1963),
39 B.YI.L. 402-24.
77. War Crimes Act 1946 Geo VI, C.73 at 489-90.
78. Remmele referred to in 15 L.R.T.W.C. 44.
79. The Portion of the Israeli Supreme Court Judgement concerned with jurisdiction is in
(1962) 36 I.L.R. 289-304.
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crystallization of generally prevailing opinion and practice into law under
the impact of common consent and the demands of general world
security."
And at p. 418:
"Every recognition of custom as evidence of law must have a beginning
some time."80
Concerning jurisdiction, the court concluded:
"Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an
international character, but their harmful and murderous effects were so
embracing and widespread as to shake the international community to its
very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the
principle of universal jurisdiction and the capacity of a guardian of
international law and an agent for its enforcement, to try the appellant.
That being the case, no importance attaches to the fact that the State of
Israel did not exist when the offences were committed.8'
The written decision of the Israeli court in the Demjanjuk case was not
available at the time of writing. Two American cases concerning
Demjanjuk do, however, buttress the decision of the Israeli Supreme
Court in Eichmann. In Matter of Extradition of John Dem/anjuk, a US
District Court gave a relatively sketchy review of the law, assumed that
as war crimes and crimes against humanity are international crimes then
universal jurisdiction exists, and finally, relying on the Lotus case,
concluded: "Respondent cites no authority to show that Israel would
violate international law by asserting jurisdiction over respondent based
on the universality principle .... Israel's assertion of jurisdiction does not
impinge or interfere with any other state's jurisdiction since no other
nation has requested respondent's extradition."82 In Demjanjuk v
Petrovsky,83 a US Appeals Court upheld the District Court decision.
Concerning the Israeli claim to exercise jurisdiction based on the
universality principle, the court observed that the post-war crimes
tribunals must have derived jurisdiction from the universality principle, a
questionable proposition, and concluded, "whatever doubts existed prior
to 1945 have been erased by the general recognition since that time that
there is a jurisdiction over some types of crimes which extends beyond
the territorial limits of any nation." The court also quoted the
Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
as an authority. Section 404 states in part: "A state may exercise
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offences, recognized by the
80. Id, at 290.
81. Id, at 304.
82. In the Matter of the Extradition of John Demjanjuk (1985), 612 F Supp. 544 (D.C. Ohio)
at 558.
83. Demjanjuk vPetrovsky (1985), 776 F 2d. 571 (USCA - 6th Circuit).
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community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps
terrorism... ,84
National law of war manuals provide some indication of state practice
concerning jurisdiction. As indicators of apparently differing views on the
subject, the 1958 British Land Warfare Manual, prepared in part by Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht, asserts at para. 637 that war crimes are crimes ex
jure gentium and are thus triable by the courts of all states.85 In contrast,
the 1956 US Army Law of War Manual, prepared in part by Richard
Baxter, a distinguished American international lawyer, asserts that war
crimes are international crimes at para. 498 but at para. 507 (mislabeled
Universality of Jurisdiction) it asserts merely that US military courts may
try persons accused of committing war crimes against US nationals,
nationals of allies and of co-belligerents and stateless persons.8 6
The major post-World War II law of war treaties, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977 contain grave
breach provisions listing major offences and provide for a variant of
universal jurisdiction.8 7 If these treaties apply to a conflict and an
individual is alleged to have committed a grave breach then any party to
the treaty may try the alleged offender. The Hague Cultural Property
Convention of 1954 also contains an offence section which provides for
a variant of universal jurisdiction, but as Canada is not a party to the
treaty it would not be appropriate at this time for Canada to try alleged
offenders against this Convention.88
Carnegie, in his 1963 study "Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Laws
and Customs of War", comes to a tentative conclusion:
"Where the right to exercise jurisdiction must be based on customary
international law if it is to be exercised at all, the country of which the
victim of the crime is a national may always exercise jurisdiction in virtue
of the passive personality principle; probably, the ally of any such country
may also exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the same principle. Finally,
the development of the law in this field seems to be moving towards a
recognition of universal jurisdiction over all serious war crimes; and it
would not seem unreasonable to conclude that this recognition was
already complete. '8 9
84. Id, at 582.
85. UKManual supra note 33.
86. The Law of Land Warfare Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27-10
(Washington, D.C. 1956) at 178-82.
87. See, for example, Art. 146 and 147 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention quoted
above footnote 44.
88. Art. 28, Schindler and Toman, supra note 10, at 672.
89. Carnegie, supra note 76, at 424.
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For World War II related offences, the right to exercise jursidiction must
be based on customary international law.
At the end of this discussion of jurisdiction, we return to the Lotus
decision and the philosophical predispositions underlying the majority
and dissenting judgments. Do states have the freedom to articulate
relatively new bases of jurisdiction which will result in persons who were
foreign nationals at the time of the offences being subjected to criminal
trials by their courts? Should jurisdictional principles which apply today,
and major war crimes today are within the scope of the universality
principle, be extrapolated into the past?
In any event, it is suggested that an assertion that jurisdiction is a
procedural matter and that retrospective application of procedural
provisions as the normal legal approach is unduly simplistic where war
crimes and crimes against humanity are concerned. Jurisdiction may well
be a procedural matter when one is concerned with the question of venue
or the allocation of jurisdiction among particular Canadian criminal
courts. When, however, the question is whether or not, as a matter of
international law, any Canadian court has the right to exercise
jurisdiction over an offender, the question is fundamental. At the very
least, it verges on matters of substance.
VI. Canadian Experience With the Law of War
In both World Wars, a large number of prisoners of war were taken by
Canadian Forces and a substantial number were confined in prisoner of
war camps in Canada. During World War II, Canada was bound by the
three predecessors of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: The 1929
Geneva Conventions on the Wounded and Sick in the Field and on
Prisoners of War and Hague Convention X of 1907 which adapted the
principles of the Geneva Conventions to Maritime Warfare. In Canada,
during World War II, the War Measures Act90 provided a legislative basis
for a series of orders in council concerning "Regulations Governing the
maintenance of discipline among the treatment of prisoners of war".91
These regulations governed the treatment of both prisoners of war in the
normal meaning of the words and of civilian internees such as enemy
aliens detained under the Defence of Canadian regulations. The
traditional prisoners of war, members of enemy armed forces, were
referred to as Prisoners of War Class I and treated in accordance with the
90. WarMeasuresActR.S.C. 1985, c. W-2.
91. Regulations Governing the Maintenance of Discipline Among and Treatment of Prisoners
of War P.C. 4121 of 13 December 1939 as amended. Office Consolidation on file in the Office
of the Judge Advocate General.
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1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Civilian internees were
referred to as Prisoners of War Class II and were treated in accordance
with the 1929 Convention subject to certain exclusions. The regulations
incorporated the 1929 Convention into Canadian law and established a
disciplinary system for prisoners of war. Prisoners of war were subject to
Canadian military law as if they were members of the various Canadian
Forces. In addition, certain special orders applied to them, such as:
"11. Deliberate disobedience, coupled with resistance or apprehended
resistance to officers, guards or sentries, or other conduct of a mutinous or
riotous kind, will, if necessary, be dealt with by force of arms.
12. It is to be distinctly understood that any Prisoner of War attempting
to pass the boundary fence, wall, or to go out through any gate, exit or
other opening without a permit signed by the Commandant after being
once duly warned and disregarding that warning, will be fired on.92
Prisoners of War could be tried by summary trial or by court martial. In
certain circumstances, they could also be tried before civil courts.
During World War II, there were a number of cases concerning
prisoners of war before Canadian civil courts. Four of the cases, Krebs,
Brosig, Kaehler, and Shindler concerned offences committed in
attempting to escape. In Krebs,93 an Ontario Magistrate held that a
prisoner of war who breaks and enters a dwelling house and steals a
number of articles for the purpose of facilitating his escape from a
prisoner of war camp, is not criminally responsible. On the other hand,
in Shindler,94 an Alberta Magistrate held simply that a prisoner of war
who steals an automobile in the course of his escape from an internment
camp is, by virtue of the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention, subject to
the criminal law of Canada. Further, in Brosig,95 the Ontario Court of
Appeal reversed a magistrate's decision and held that a prisoner of war
is criminally responsible for the looting of a mail bag and the taking of
articles therefrom for his personal use in the course of an escape and may
be convicted of theft in respect thereof. In Kaehler, 96 the Alberta Court
of Appeal held that a prisoner of war is entitled to the protection of the
laws of Canada and therefore owes obedience to the laws of Canada,
although brought against his will within the territory where such laws are
administered. A prisoner of war was not immune at common law from
criminal liability for offences committed in furtherance of his escape and
this liability is clearly recognized by Art. 51 of the 1929 Convention.
92. Id, at 4.
93. R. v. Krebs (1943), 80 C.C.C. 279 (Ont. Mag. CL).
94. R. v. Schindler(1944), 82 C.C.C. 206 (Alta Mag. CL).
95. R. v. Brosig(1945), 83 C.C.C. 199 (Ont. C.A.)
96. R v. Kaehler and Stolski(1945), 83 C.C.C. 353 (Alta. C.A.)
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(Art. 51 indicated that attempted escape should not be considered as
aggravating related offences).
In Perzenowski 97 the Alberta Court of Appeal was concerned with an
incident in which a number of prisoners of war killed a fellow prisoner
in a prisoner of war camp because they considered him to be a traitor.
The accused were convicted of murder at trial and argued on appeal that
the court had no jurisdiction to try them for the offence, that their act was
an act of war, and that in any event only the military authorities had
jurisdiction unless they transferred the jurisdiction to the civil court. The
Court upheld the murder convictions. It held the civil court not only had
jurisdiction, but it was the only tribunal with jurisdiction to try a prisoner
of war for the murder of a fellow prisoner of war in a prisoner of war
camp in Canada. The belief of the accused that their victim was a traitor
to their common country was not sufficient provocation to reduce the
offence to manslaughter; nor did their belief that they were compelled by
their military law to comply with orders given them to commit the
murder furnish any excuse or justification. The Perzenowski case is a
strong statement against the idea of holding kangaroo courts in prisoner
of war camps.
The direct utility of these World War II prisoner of war cases is
limited. On the other hand, they do illustrate some of the problems which
occur when Canadian courts are faced with unfamiliar international law
problems.
The handling of war crimes cases is another area where the law of war
impacts on Canadian law. An obvious question is "have Canadian
servicemen ever committed war crimes or been tried for them?" The
simple answer is we don't know for certain, but we can make some
educated guesses. First, it would be hyocritical to pretend that Canadian
servicemen have never committed war crimes. There is some indication
that Breaker Morant, an Australian executed for killing prisoners in the
Boer War, and the subject of a fairly recent movie, learned some of his
techniques from the members of the Canadian cavalry unit, Lord
Strathcona's Horse. There is no doubt Canadians have killed prisoners on
occasion. A recent book by Tony Foster, Meeting of Generals98 includes
several references to orders given by Canadian commanders to kill
prisoners. It is not clear if these orders were carried out. In addition, the
recently published memoirs of General Vokes, one of our Divisional
Commanders in Italy during World War II, displays in several places
97. R. v. Perzenowksi and Others, [1945] 3 W.W.R. 678 (Aita. C.A.)
98. Tony Foster, Meeting of Generals (Toronto: Methuen, 1986).
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what can most charitably be described as a somewhat cavalier approach
to the law of war.99
There is no indication Canadian servicemen have been tried for war
crimes by foreign military courts. Nor have any Canadian servicemen
been sentenced to death during the world wars for offences under
military law which are analogous to war crimes such as murder of
civilians. Whether or not Canadian servicemen have been court
martialed for war crimes type offences under military law and been
awarded sentences less than death is unclear as the records available are
inadequate.
One rather bizarre war crimes case did involve a Canadian, but not a
member of our forces. The Kamloops Kid was a Japanese Canadian who
found himself in Japan after Pearl Harbor. He acted as a translator and
interrogator for the Japanese troops at a prisoner of war camp where the
Canadian Hong Kong survivors were being held. At the end of the war
he was tried by a British military court on war crimes charges, convicted,
and sentenced to death. His counsel subsequently raised the argument
that his client was a Canadian citizen. Once this was confirmed, the
finding of the court was quashed, and the Kamloops Kid was released
from military custody. As a classic example of good news, bad news,
however, he was then arrested by Hong Kong civil authorities, tried
before a civil court under the British Treachery Act, convicted, and
hanged.
Canada did hold a number of war crimes trials involving German
nationals at the end of World War II. The domestic legal basis for these
trials was the War Crimes Regulations and the War Crimes Act. The
Governor in Council initially passed the War Crimes Regulations on 30
August 1945 under the authority of the War Measures Act.10° "War
crime" was defined as:
(f) "War crime" means a violation of the laws or usages of war
committed during any war in which Canada has been or may be engaged
at any time after the ninth day of September, 1939.101
The regulations governed the custody, trial and punishment of war
crimes suspects. Basically, the regulations adapted and adopted the
Canadian military law of the day, that is, British military law, for war
crime trials. Some of the traditional evidentiary rules were relaxed. Here
is an example:
99. C. Vokes, My Story (Ottawa, 1985).
100. P.C. 5831 of August 30, 1945.
101. Supra note 77, at 488.
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10. (1) At any hearing before a military court convened under these
Regulations the court may take into consideration any oral statement or
any document appearing on the face of it to be authentic, provided the
statement or document appears to the court to be of assistance in proving
or disproving the charge, notwithstanding that such statement or
document would not be admissible as evidence in proceedings before a
field general court-martial.102
Here are some others:
10(4) Where there is evidence that more than one war crime has been
committed by members of a formation, unit, body, or group while under
the command of a single commander, the court may receive that evidence
as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of the commander for those
crimes.
(5) Where there is evidence that a war crime has been committed by
members of a formation, unit, body or group and that an officer or non-
commissioned officer was present at or immediately before the time when
such offence was committed, the court may receive that evidence as prima
facie evidence of the responsibility of such officer or non-commissioned
officer, and of the commander of such formation, unit, body, or group, for
that crime. 103
The Regulations provided for the imposition of the death penalty as a
maximum punishment. On further legal review, it was pointed out to the
Government that, as the War Crimes Regulations were passed under the
War Measures Act which provided for a maximum punishment of five
years imprisonment for violations, the legality of the death penalty
provision in the War Crimes Regulations was debatable. In order to cure
the perceived defect, The War Crimes Act was passed in 1946 to reenact
the War Crimes Regulations and the Act was deemed to have come into
force on 30 August 1945, the day on which the War Crimes Regulations
were initially approved by Order-in-Council. 104
Canada had War Crimes Investigation Units investigating a number of
incidents in Europe and the Far East at the end of World War II and four
war crimes trials were held before Canadian military courts in Aurich,
Germany in 1945-46. The best known trial is that of Kurt Meyer.105
Meyer was accused, while Commander of the 25th S.S. Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, of having incited and counselled his men to deny quarter to
allied troops, ordered (or in the alternative been responsible for) the
102. Id, at 491.
103 Id, at 492.
104. Id, at 489-90 also B.J.S. Macdonald, The Trial of Kurt Meyer (Toronto: Clark, Irwin,
1954) at 37-58.
105. Trial of S.S. Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer, 4 L.R.T.W.C. 97. A transcript of the trial is on
file in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
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shooting of prisoners of war at his headquarters, and been responsible for
other such shootings at his headquarters and during the fighting nearby.
He pleaded not guilty. The prosecutor referred to the presumptions
contained in Sections 10(4) and (5) of the War Crimes Regulations,
quoted above, in his argument, as the case against Meyer was,
understandably, based essentially on circumstantial evidence. For that
matter, bearing in mind the importance of discipline in combat units,
these presumptions probably merely codify the conclusions which would
be drawn by any experienced military officer. Meyer was found guilty of
the incitement and counselling, and was held responsible for the
shootings at his headquarters, though not guilty of ordering them, and
was found not to be responsible for the shootings outside his
headquarters. He was sentenced to death, but Canadian military
authorities commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. Meyer's
sentence was eventually reduced to fourteen years and he was actually
released in 1954. Following his release, Meyer was employed by a
brewery and, in the words of his most recent biographer "he managed to
introduce the delights of Andreas bottled beer to the messes of the
Canadian armed forces serving in Europe."'10 6
The other three cases all involved offences against RCAF prisoners of
war. Johann Neitz0 7 was sentenced to life imprisonment after being
convicted of firing two shots into the body of Flying Officer Rudolph
Anthony Roman, a prisoner of war, with intent to kill. Flying Officer
Roman survived the war. Wilhelm Jung, a civilian Nazi party official,
and Johann Schumacher,108 a German soldier, were tried jointly on a
charge of committing a war crime in that they, at the village of Oberweir,
Germany, in July 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were
concerned in the killing of Conrad William Martins, a member of the
RCAF, a prisoner of war. Both accused raised unsuccessful pleas of
superior orders. Both were convicted, sentenced to death, and executed.
In the last case, Robert Holzer, Walter Wigel and Wilhelm
Ossenbach'0 9 were tried jointly on a charge of committing a war crime
in that they, near the town of Opladen, Germany, during the month of
March, 1945, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned
in the killing of an unknown Canadian Airman, a member of the RCAF,
a prisoner of war. All three accused attempted unsuccessfully to raise the
plea of superior orders. All three were convicted. Holzer and Weigel were
sentenced to death and executed. Ossenbach, presumably because he did
106. Foster, supra note 98, at 513.
107. A transcript of the trial is on file in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
108. A transcript of the trial is on file in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
109. A transcript of the trial is on file in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
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not actually shoot the victim, was given a lesser sentence of fifteen years
imprisonment.
There have been no prosecutions under the War Crimes Act, since
these cases at the end of World War II. The Act remains in force, but it
has not been republished in the various revised statutes. It is, however,
archaic legislation which, if it was applied today, could result in a large
number of successful arguments under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.
In 1965, Canada ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and passed
implementing legislation, the Geneva Conventions Act."0 As indicated
earlier, grave breaches are major violations of the Geneva Conventions
and constitute war crimes. Section 3 of the Geneva Conventions Act
establishes jurisdiction concerning grave breaches.
2. (1) Any grave breach of any of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as
therein defined, that would, if committed in Canada, be an offence under
any provisions of the Criminal Code or other Act of the Parliament of
Canada, is an offence under such provision of the Criminal Code of other
Act if committed outside Canada.(2) Where a person has committed an act or omission that is an offence
by virtue of this section, the offence is within the competence of and may
be tried and punished by the court having jurisdiction in respect of similar
offences in the place in Canada where that person is found in the same
manner as if the offence had been committed in that place, or by any other
court to which jurisdiction has been lawfully transferred.
(3) No proceedings in respect of an act or omission that is an offence by
virtue of this section shall be instituted without the consent in writing of
the Attorney General of Canada.
Not all grave breaches become offences under Canadian law as a result
of this section. The grave breach only becomes an offence if the act would
be an offence under other Canadian law if committed in Canada. Section
7 of the Act subjects prisoners of war to the military Code of Service
Discipline and s.8 authorizes the Minister of National Defence to make
regulations respecting prisoners of war. No such regulations are in place
at the present time. No one has ever been prosecuted in Canada by means
of the Geneva Conventions Act; although it would appear to be
particularly relevant legislation for the prosecution of war criminals in
contemporary conflicts.
Prior to the establishment of the Desch~nes Commission in 1985, the
only Canadian statutes relevant to the war crimes issue were the War
Crimes Act and the Geneva Conventions Act. Indeed, one of the
recommendations made in Law Reform Commission Working Paper 37
of 1984 on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction was the following:
110. Geneva Conventions Ac, R.S.C. 1985, c.G-3.
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That the Government of Canada authorize a study of the complex subject
of war crimes including relevant aspects of international law, comparative
law, constitutional law, criminal law and military law with a view to
determining what war crimes legislation should be enacted by Canada to
replace our present outdated legislation. Until that study is done, any other
recommendations would be premature. Regardless of who undertakes the
study, the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada and the
Departments of Justice, National Defence and External Affairs should be
included as participants in it."'
The extradition of Helmut Rauca, an alleged German war criminal, to
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1983 to stand trial on war crimes
charges constituted, however, a modest indicator of reviving interest in
the war crimes issue." 2
VII. The Desch~nes Report and the Governmental Response
The Desch~nes Commission was established on 7 February 1985 to
determine whether "persons responsible for war crimes related to the
activities of Nazi Germany during World War II (hereinafter referred to
as war criminals)" were resident in Canada and to recommend what
present or proposed legislation could be used to ensure that such war
criminals are brought to justice.113 The Commission issued its Report on
30 December 1986, concluding that alleged war criminals, as defined in
its terms of reference, were present in Canada and that neither the War
Crimes Act, nor the Geneva Conventions Act were appropriate legal
vehicles for prosecution of Nazi war criminals. In addition to its other
recommendations, the Commission recommended that the Criminal
Code should be used as the vehicle for the prosecution of war criminals
in Canada and that s. 6 of the Code be amended by adding the following
subsections:
(1.a) For the purposes of this section, "war crime" and "crime against
humanity" mean respectively:
a) War crime: a violation, committed during any past or future war, of
the laws of customs of war as illustrated in paragraph 6(b) of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal which sat in
Nuremberg, and irrespective of the participation or not of Canada in
that war;
b) Crime against humanity: an offence committed in time either of peace
or of a past or future war, namely murder, extermination,
111. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 37: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
(Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1984) at 86.
112. R and Federal Republic of Germany v Rauca (1983), 34 C.R. (3d) 97 and S. Littman,
War Criminal on Trial- The Rauca Case (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1983).
113. Desch~nes, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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enslavement, deportation or other inhumane act committed against
any civilian population or persecution on political, racial or religious
grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated, as illustrated, but without limitation in
time or space, in paragraph 67(c) of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal which sat in Nuremberg.
(1.10) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act,
a) where a person has committed outside Canada, at any time before or
after the coming into force of this subsection, an act or omission
constituting a war crime or a crime against humanity, and
b) where the act or omission if committed in Canada would have
constituted an offence under Canadian law,
that person shall be deemed to have committed that act or omission in
Canada if
c) the person who has committed the act or omission or a victim of the
act or omission was, at the time of the act or omission,
(i) a Canadian citizen, or
(ii) a person employed by Canada in a military or civilian capacity;
or
later became a Canadian citizen; or
d) the person who has committed the act or omission is, after the act or
omission has been committed, present in Canada.' 14
The scope of the proposed amendment is quite broad as it suggests that
Canada could and should prosecute persons who have allegedly
committed war crimes when Canada has not been involved in the war
and persons who have allegedly committed crimes against humanity in
time of peace or war. As indicated earlier, it is debatable whether or not
Canada had a right under international customary law in the 1940's or
earlier to exercise jurisdiction over alleged war criminals when Canada
was not involved in the war. In contemporary international conflicts,
Canada clearly would have a treaty-based right to exercise jurisdiction
because the Geneva Conventions of 1949 would apply to the conflict and
the alleged war crimes would be grave breaches of these Conventions.
Further, whatever the current legal definition of crimes against humanity,
it does not appear that anyone has ever been prosecuted for crimes
against humanity committed in time of peace. Indeed, the IMT, in its
judgment, deliberately failed to address alleged crimes against humanity
committed before the commencement of World War II. As Canada was
a participant in World War II, it is quite clear that it would have a sound
basis in international law for prosecuting persons who allegedly
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity while acting on behalf
of Nazi Germany or its allies during that conflict.
114. Id, at 6-7.
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In its initial response to the Desch~nes Commission recommendations,
the Federal Government indicated it would take certain measures to
restrict the possibility of war criminals immigrating to Canada and that
it would adopt a "made in Canada" approach whereby alleged war
criminals would be tried for their offences under a new law before
Canadian courts using Canadian evidentiary standards. The Canadian
approach would differ from the American approach as war crimes
prosecutions would be handled by the Federal Department of Justice and
not by an Office of Special Investigations and as the accused would be
tried for their offences before Canadian courts, rather than be stripped of
Canadian citizenship and sent elsewhere for trial. It was, however, made
clear that any new law would comply with international law as well as
with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which specifies in section 1 l(g)
that "Any person charged with an offence has the right (... ) (g) not to be
found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the
act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international
law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized
by the community of nations".
The Government's legislative response was contained in Bill C-71, an
Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the
Citizenship Act," 5 which was introduced in the House of Commons for
first reading on June 23, 1987, passed without amendment, and entered
into force on September 16 and October 30, 1987. Bill C-71 amended
Section 6 of the Criminal Code to make war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed outside of Canada into offences triable before
Canadian courts under certain circumstances. In lieu of the Desch~nes
Commission definitions, it defined "crime against humanity" and "war
crime" as follows in the new Section 6 (1.96) of the Criminal Code:
"crime against humanity" means murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is
committed against any civilian population or any indentifiable group of
persons, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force
at the time and in the place of its commission, and that, at that time and
in that place, constitutes a contravention of customary international law or
conventional international law or is criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations;
"war crime" means an act or omission that is committed during an
international armed conflict, whether or not it constitutes a contravention
of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission, and that,
at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of the customary
international law or conventional international law applicable in
international armed conflicts.
115. S.C. 1987, c.37.
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Both definitions indicate that the prohibited acts or omissions must
violate international law at the time when and in the place where they are
committed. As indicated earlier, war crimes must be acts or omissions
committed during an international armed conflict and, as a general
statement, international armed conflicts can be considered to be conflicts
between two or more states. It is obvious that atrocities may also occur
in non-international armed conflicts but, if these acts are to be punishable
as a result of Bill C-71, the acts must be classifiable as crimes against
humanity. It should be noted that war crimes must constitute a violation
of applicable customary or conventional international law while crimes
against humanity might also be criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations. The central
features of both definitions are that they are open-ended, that they can
develop over time, and that it is not possible to determine whether or not
a particular act or omission constitutes a war crime or crime against
humanity without reviewing the international law applicable when and
where the act or omission occurred.
As suggested by the Deschenes Commission, war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed outside Canada must cross the hurdle of
double criminality before they are punishable as a result of Bill C-7 1. The
act or omission must be a war crime or crime against humanity where
and when it was committed and it must also be an act or omission which,
is committed in Canada, would have constituted an offence under
Canadian law applicable at the time. If the act or omission meets both
criteria and, in addition, certain jurisdictional criteria are met, then the act
or omission is deemed to have been committed in Canada. The double
criminality approach is also used in the Geneva Conventions Act to
penalize in Canada the commission of grave breaches outside of Canada.
As a result of this approach, individuals are likely to be charged with
violations of other sections of the Criminal Code rather than be charged
directly with war crimes or crimes against humanity contrary to s.6.
Bill C-71 also establishes special extraterritorial jurisdictional criteria
for trials before Canadian courts. As a matter of law, the acts of omissions
are deemed to have been committed in Canada under s.6(1.91)(a) of the
Criminal Code if:
(a) at the time of the act or omission,
(i) that person is a Canadian citizen or is employed by Canada in a
civilian or military capacity.
(ii) that person is a citizen of, or is employed in a civilian or military
capacity by, a state that is engaged in an armed conflict against
Canada, or
(iii) the victim of the act or omission is a Canadian citizen or a citizen
of a state that is allied with Canada in an armed conflict;
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It is suggested that Canada's right to exercise jurisdiction under
international law over persons in the above categories alleged to have
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity during or since World
War II is, on the basis of the discussion of jurisdictional issues earlier in
this article, unquestionable. These jurisdictional criteria are, however,
somewhat narrower than those recommended by the Desch~nes
Commission. Two groups which are not covered under s.6(1.91)(a) are
non-Canadians participating in an international armed conflict in which
Canada is not engaged, for example, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the
citizens or employees of Canada's allies when Canada is engaged in an
armed conflict, for example, the U.S.S.R. during World War II. The
writer is unaware of any case in which a state had tried the citizens or
employees of an ally for alleged war crimes committed against an enemy.
Although one might question when, and to what extent, war crimes and
crimes against humanity became international crimes to which universal
jurisdiction attaches, it is probable that major war crimes are
international crimes to which universal jurisdiction attaches today. In
order to provide a domestic law basis for trying persons alleged to have
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity which takes account
of expanding jurisdictional bases in international law, s.6(1.91)(b)
provides that acts or omissions are also deemed to have been committed
in Canada if:
(b) at the time of the act or omission, Canada could, in conformity with
international law, exercise jurisdiction over the person with respect to
the act or omission on the basis of the person's presence in Canada,
and subsequent to the time of act or omission the person is present in
Canada.
Under s.6(1.91)(b), the prosecution must establish that Canada could, at
the time of the act or omission, have exercised jurisdiction in conformity
with international law. Under s.6(1.91)(a) conformity with international
law is presumed.
In any proceedings with respect to war crimes or crimes against
humanity related charges must be conducted in accordance with the
Canadian laws of evidence and procedure in force at the time of the
proceedings (s.6(1.92)). An accused may, however, rely on any
justification, excuse or defence available under the laws of Canada or
under international law at the time of the offence was allegedly
committed or at the time of the proceedings (s.6(1.93)). As a result, it
may be expected that Canadian courts will be required to deal with
defences peculiar to the law of war such as military necessity, reprisals
and superior orders. Section 6(1.94) specifies that the accused may not,
however, use the fact that an act was in compliance with local law as a
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defence. Here, at least, international law overrides domestic law. Bill C-
71 also contains provisions specifying that no prosecution may take place
without the personal consent in writing of the Attorney General or
Deputy Attorney General of Canada (s.6,(1.95)) and that certificates
issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State for External
Affairs are admissible as proof that certain states were engaged in armed
conflicts or that certain treaties were in effect (s.6(9)).
VIII. Conclusion
As a result of the Desch~nes Report and the governmental response to it,
Canada now has an appropriate legal vehicle to prosecute persons who
are alleged to have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Canada need not be in future, if it ever was in the past, a refuge for war
criminals. One may, however, presume that the lawyers in the
Department of Justice who are responsible for conducting war crimes
prosecutions will have a very difficult task in front of them. To obtain a
conviction, they must establish that the accused committed an act or
omission which was a war crime or a crime against humanity at the time
when and in the place where it was committed, that the court has a sound
basis in international law for exercising jurisdiction, and that the act or
omission would have constituted an offence under Canadian law at the
time it occurred. They must do this in compliance with all of the
procedural and evidentiary safeguards in current Canadian law and
recognizing that the accused may, with one exception, rely on any
justification, excuse or defence available under Canadian law or
international law at the time of the occurrence or of the proceedings. The
exception is that the accused may not raise the defence that his act was
in compliance with the domestic law applicable at the time and place of
the occurrence. Quite clearly, the prosecution must establish much more
than the simple fact that the act or omission is analogous to an offence
under the Criminal Code. To paraphrase the quotation from Robert Bolt
with which this article begins, we give the Devil benefit of law, for our
own safety's sake.
